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Connections and Tensions Between Nationalist and
Sustainability Discourses in the Scottish Legislative Process
Andrea Ross* and Rhys Jones**
This article illustrates how sustainability and nationalist discourses
have operated together in practice in Scotland. Potential connections
and tensions between nationalist and sustainability discourses are
identified and used to analyse the events leading up to the passage of
the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 and the Regulatory Reform
(Scotland) Act 2014. The analysis reveals how in certain contexts, the
tensions and connections between sustainability and nationalist dis-
courses can align to reinforce transformative initiatives while in other
contexts, the tensions can lead to initiatives being watered down or set
aside. The article concludes that more could be done to emphasize the
connections between the two discourses. Engagement at the level of
`nation' can lead to sustainability discourses that are more attuned
to nationalist values, increased public understanding, and acceptance
of sustainable development, as well as additional opportunities for
debate, public participation, and education.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Scottish National Party, the massive turnout for the Scottish
referendum on independence,1 and successful events such as the Glasgow
Commonwealth Games are indicative of a growing sense of nationalism
within Scotland. One consequence of this heightened nationalism has been to
raise discourses about Scottishness beyond sentiment and rhetoric to being
something potentially transformative. During the same period, the inter-
national community, states, regions, businesses, and individuals have all
struggled to move beyond the rhetoric of sustainable development to
promote the transformational changes needed to effectively tackle modern
problems such as climate change, poverty, biodiversity loss, increasing
consumption, and limited resources.
This article illustrates how sustainability and nationalist discourses have
operated together in practice in Scotland.2 More specifically, it shows how in
certain contexts, the tensions and connections between sustainability and
nationalist discourses can align to reinforce transformative initiatives while in
other contexts, the tensions between the two can lead to initiatives being
watered down or set aside. It is hoped that this type of work will improve
understanding of how sustainable development practices in certain places is
informed by the particularities of those places. More radically, by developing
a better understanding of the connections and tensions between discourses of
nationalism and sustainable development, more effective and transformative
interpretations of sustainable development may be promoted.
This research is primarily based on a thorough review of the relevant
legislation, policy, and academic and other commentary in press and online.
It also draws on previous research in law, politics, and geography on
sustainability, nation, identity, and multi-level governance. Semi-structured
interviews with key actors were used to close any gaps, better understand
context, and check certain findings. The article begins with a short history of
sustainable development and suggests certain key features as essential for
moving sustainability discourses away from `business as usual' to more
transformative action. Previous research into sub-state efforts in promoting
transformational sustainable development is examined and a possible role for
`nationalist discourses' highlighted. Potential connections and tensions
between nationalist and sustainability discourses are then identified. These
are used to analyse the events leading up to the passage of the Climate
Change (Scotland) Act 2009 and the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act
2014. The article concludes that while there is no guarantee that nationalist
discourses will promote transformative visions of sustainability, more could
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1 On 18 September 2014 Scots were asked whether they thought Scotland should be
an independent country. Over 85 per cent of those eligible voted and while most
voted to stay in the United Kingdom, 45 per cent voted in favour of independence.
2 The specific terminology used in this article is set out in section 2.
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be done to emphasize the connections between the two discourses. Engage-
ment at the level of `nation' can lead to sustainability discourses that are
more attuned to nationalist values, a higher level of public understanding,
and acceptance of sustainable development, as well as providing additional
opportunities for debate, public participation, and education.
TERMINOLOGY
This article is packed with ambiguous terms and it is very easy for the messy
terminology to prohibit any sort of analysis. The definitions used here are not
without controversy, do not sit neatly with every definition used elsewhere,
and most are deliberately open-ended enough to allow multiple variations to
exist.
`Nation' in this article is defined as `a historically constituted, stable
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory,
economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common
culture.'3 As James accounts, it is also useful to remember that:
A nation is at once an objectively abstract society of strangers, usually
connected by a state, and a subjectively embodied community whose members
experience themselves as an integrated group of compatriots.4
Scotland is described in political and public discourse as a separate nation,
albeit one, according to some commentators, that possesses links to British
forms of identity.5 Interestingly, as a Union, the concept of nation in the
United Kingdom is different from statehood especially in Scotland, Wales,
and Northern Ireland.6 Thus, for our purposes, it makes sense to see Scotland
as a nation. Indeed, Keating notes that `Most people in Scotland are both
British and Scottish, with only a minority seeing these as exclusive.'7
As a result, `national' as used here is broader than that belonging to a
sovereign state. In this article, the sovereign state is referred to as `the state'
and where power is internally shared through a federal or devolved system of
division of powers, these bodies are referred to as sub-states. Thus, states like
United Kingdom and Canada are multi-national sovereign states who
encompass more than one national community within their boundaries.
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3 I. Jughashvili, `National Question' (in Russian) (1913) Prosveshcheniye (nos.
3±5).
4 P. James, Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community (1996)
34.
5 M. Keating, `The strange death of Unionist Scotland' (2010) 45 Government and
Opposition 365, at 373; A. Henderson and N. McEwen, `Do Shared Values
Underpin National Identity? Examining the Role of Values in National Identity in
Canada and the United Kingdom' (2005) 7 National Identities 173.
6 id.
7 id.
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Scottish national identity is embedded within the British national community
and as such, Scotland can be referred to as a `sub-state nation'.8
`Nationalist discourses' refer to the words and practices of a range of
different individuals and organizations involved in promoting particular
nations or, as Brubaker has put it, the `group-making project of the nation'.9
As Billig has shown, we are all ± whether we like it or not ± bound up in the
discourses of nationalism.10 As such, nationalist discourses can be articu-
lated by a suite of different organizations, ranging from political parties,
governmental organizations, and NGOs engaged in different aspects of
social and environmental life (including social media). Nationalist discourses
can support a sense of belonging to the imagined community of the nation.
While perceived shared values are not in themselves a sufficient basis to
build national unity and are often very hard to identify, the discourse of
shared values can reinforce a sense of belonging, even to newcomers, and
serve as a tool in the politics of nation building.11 Moreover, nationalist
discourses include but extend well beyond the policies and practices of
nationalist parties or how governments use territorial distinctiveness or what
is often referred to as `territorial politics' to maximize their region's
autonomy and its status within the larger state and beyond.12 The result is
that these discourses can accommodate a plurality of views and visions.
Indeed, notions of Scottish identity are also broad, varied, and sometimes
contradictory. As Keating explains: `For some, Scottishness is a cultural and
historical identity with little relevance to constitutional issues; at the other
extreme, it leads directly for support for independence.'13
Our interpretation of `sustainability discourses' includes those words and
practices promoted by a range of individuals and organizations, which focus
attention on the need to consider the impacts of current practices on environ-
mental, economic, and social futures.14 However, as is discussed below, an
objective of this article is to establish if connections exist that can promote
more transformative sustainable development. To this end, we have narrowed
the popular Brundtland definition slightly to focus more specifically on those
discourses that prioritize the long-term effects of policy and decisions and go
beyond `business as usual' solutions. This interpretation still allows signifi-
cant variation, especially in relation to the role of the economy and growth in
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8 Henderson and McEwen, op. cit., n. 5.
9 R. Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (2004); C. Calhoun, Nationalism (1993).
10 M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (1995).
11 Henderson and McEwen, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 188±9.
12 N. McEwen and E. Bomberg, `Sub-state Climate Pioneers: The Case of Scotland'
(2014) 24 Regional and Federal Studies 63, at 69; Calhoun, op. cit., n. 9.
13 Keating, op. cit., n. 5, p. 377.
14 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common
Future (1987) (the Brundtland Report).
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sustainable development and the extent to which operating within the Earth's
limits should be explicitly prioritized.15
Finally, the analysis that follows covers not only the content or substance
of nationalist and sustainability discourses but also the processes and
practices that characterize them including, for example, the emphasis and
value placed on wider participation and the need for credible scientific
evidence in policy and decision making.16
THE NEED TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
In 1987 the World Commission on sustainable development produced a
report, Our Common Future, that offered sustainable development as a
means to address the growing challenges of environmental degradation and
world poverty at the same time. `Sustainable development' was defined as
`development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (the Brundtland
definition).17 It proved popular and resilient as an ideal largely due to its
malleability and became a global objective in 1992 following the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (or Earth Summit) in
Rio de Janeiro.18 Since then, sustainable development has been included in
numerous multilateral and bilateral conventions and treaties as a binding
objective.19 It is an objective of the European Union,20 and a key policy
objective for many cities, businesses, and individuals.21
Out of Brundtland's wide parameters, a powerful discourse has emerged
that combines an accepted global definition with a degree of fluidity that
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15 For differing views, see United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Towards a
Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (2011),
at <www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/ger/ger_final_dec_2011/Green
per cent20EconomyReport_Final_Dec2011.pdf> 17, 259; T. Jackson, Prosperity without
Growth: The transition to a sustainable economy (2009).
16 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Improving
Policy Coherence and Integration for Sustainable Development: A Checklist (2002).
17 WCED, op. cit., n. 14.
18 UN General Assembly (UNGA), Agenda 21, 1.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151.26
(1992).
19 For example, Biodiversity Convention.
20 Treaty on European Union, Article 3; Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Article 11.
21 See, for example, Singapore Government Ministry of the Environment and Water
Resources and Ministry of National Development, Sustainable Singapore Blueprint
2015, at <http://www.mewr.gov.sg/ssb/>; ARCADIS, Sustainable Cities Index
2015, at <http://www.sustainablecitiesindex.com/>; Marks and Spencer plc, Plan A
(2015), at <http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/plan-a>; Munich Airport,
Strategy 2025, at <www.munich-airport.de/en/company/konzern/strategie/
index.jsp>.
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encourages states, organizations, and individuals to work within their own
detailed interpretations based on particular circumstances. However, this
strength is also a downfall and French describes three main tensions within
the Brundtland definition.22 Tensions exist in relation to the use of
environmental resources, operating within the Earth's limits and the extent
to which natural capital can be replaced or offset by human or man-made
capital.23 There is also tension between the environment and humans, intra-
generational equity among states and within states, and intergenerational
equity between the present and future generations.24 Finally, tensions
revolve around the role of the economy and the market, and the need for
economic growth in sustainable development.25 As a result, the Brundtland
definition, while excluding some development as unsustainable, is
sufficiently broad to permit a wide range of interpretations to still be
considered legitimate.26
While there is no shortage of examples of efforts to foster economic
development, social development, and environmental protection at the same
time through energy efficiency, healthy living initiatives, immunization,
organic food production, recycling, and water use efficiency, these efforts
have been swamped by the effects of unsustainable development, including,
but not limited to: growing greenhouse gas emissions, population change,
poverty, and reduced biodiversity.27 The present human population is
currently using the equivalent of 1.5 planets to support our activities; high-
income countries have an ecological footprint five times greater than that of
low-income countries, and `business as usual' projections estimate that we
will need the equivalent of two planets by 2030 to meet our annual demands.28
We are not getting the balance right. Many of the weak or `wish list'
approaches to sustainable development use a three-pronged approach to
balance economic, social, and environmental factors which are then por-
trayed as win-win-win scenarios. These weak approaches still advocate high
economic growth and are based on the premise that technology and
international trade will ensure there are always enough resources to meet
cultural or human carrying capacity.29 These approaches can justify just
about anything so long as it promotes one of the three pillars and as such, can
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22 D. French, International Law and Policy for Sustainable Development (2005) 10±34.
23 D. Pearce, Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (1993) 15±16; J. Bowers,
Sustainability and Environmental Economics: An Alternative Text (1997) 194.
24 French, op. cit., n. 22, pp. 30±3.
25 id., p. 26
26 A. Ross, `Sustainable development in Scotland post devolution' (2006) 8 Environ-
mental Law Rev. 6.
27 See International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014 ±
Synthesis Report (2014).
28 WWF et al., The Living Planet Report 2013 (2013).
29 See, for example, statistics on automobiles. Department for Transport et al.,
Transport Statistics for Great Britain 2009 35th edition (2009) chs. 3, 9.
ß 2016 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society ß 2016 Cardiff University Law School
lead to `business as usual'. By failing to prioritize ecological sustainability,
weak approaches to sustainable development allow `short-termism' to
prevail, with little or no consideration given to the Earth's limits, the needs
of future generations or indeed, the needs of the poorer members of the
present generation.30
KEY FEATURES OF GOOD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
GOVERNANCE
Studies broadly agree that two significant changes are required for more
transformative sustainable development. The first change is largely institu-
tional and requires the full integration of environmental protection concerns,
and more broadly, sustainable development, into all forms of policy and
decision making.31 However, success is dependent on the second significant
change, which is a cultural acceptance and understanding that prioritizes
operating within the Earth's limits and thinking about the long-term effects
of policy and decisions.32 Articulating these changes into policy is not
radical. The OECD has stated that: `good governance and sound public
management are preconditions for the implementation of sustainable
development policies.'33 Similarly, Dernbach has observed that:
much of what is required for national governance for sustainable development
is also required for good governance in general . . . [including] effective
governmental institutions and national laws, a favourable investment climate,
informed and science-based decision making, and access to justice.34
Arguably, one of the best articulations of these features is from the
United Kingdom. One Future ± different paths: The UK's shared framework
for sustainable development was published jointly by all four United
Kingdom administrations in 2005.35 The framework set out five principles:
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30 D. Helm, `Objectives, instruments and institutions' in Environmental Policy Objec-
tives, Instruments and Implementation, ed. D. Helm (2000) 12; A. Ross, Sustainable
Development Law in the UK ± From Rhetoric to Reality (2012) chs. 4, 14.
31 OECD, op. cit., n. 16; P. Hardi and T. Zdan (eds.), Assessing Sustainable Develop-
ment: Principles in Practice (1997); J. Dernbach, `Targets, timetables and effective
implementing mechanisms: necessary building blocks for sustainable development'
(2002±2003) 27 William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Rev. 79; Division
for Sustainable Development, UNDESA, `Guidance in preparing national
sustainable development strategy: managing sustainable development in the new
millennium' (2002) DESA/DSD/PC2/BP13.
32 UNEP, op. cit., n. 15; Jackson, op. cit., n. 15; T. O'Riordan, `Sustainability in an age
of austerity' (2011) 23 Environmental Law & Management 160.
33 OECD, op. cit., n. 16, p. 2.
34 Dernbach, op. cit., n. 31, pp. 104±5; Hardi and Zdan, op. cit., n. 31.
35 HM Government, Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly Government, Northern
Ireland Office, One future ± different paths: the UK's shared framework for
sustainable development (2005) 8.
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living within the Earth's environmental limits; ensuring a strong, healthy,
and just society; achieving a sustainable economy; promoting good
governance; and using sound science responsibility. The first two principles
are often held out as the overall desired outcomes and the last three are
considered the enablers or means of achieving these objectives. In research
studies, the framework is regularly singled out as good practice.36 Its
principles include environmental limits and refer to a sustainable economy
rather than economic growth. The development of the strategy involved
multiple levels of government and therefore it speaks to each level.37 As its
title suggests, the administrations were to then publish their own strategies
based on the principles in the framework but in line with the needs of their
constituent areas. As discussed below, since 2007 sustainable development
policy in Scotland has changed significantly. That said, the Scottish
government, at least in its rhetoric, remains committed to the five principles
in the 2005 framework.38
THE ROLE OF STATES, SUB-STATES, AND NATIONS IN
ACCELERATING PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Many global challenges need to be tackled by all levels of governance and,
furthermore, these efforts need to be coordinated. However, while the chal-
lenges being faced by humanity are very often global in nature, in a world of
sovereign states, each with considerable authority within its own borders and
some influence outside its borders, there is no other choice but to rely on
state governments to deliver the transformation necessary for long-term
wellbeing, resilience, and sustainability. Where legislative and executive
power is shared, this is also true for sub-state bodies in federal or devolved
states. This is the view taken in the official outcome document of the United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro (Rio +20),
entitled The Future We Want, which emphasizes the critical need to
accelerate progress toward sustainability39 and encourages individual
governments and others to explore the `Future We Want' for themselves.40
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36 D. Swanson and L. Pinter `Governance strategies for national sustainable develop-
ment strategies' in OECD, Institutionalising Sustainable Development (2007) 34,
56.
37 id.
38 Scottish Government, Scottish Planning Policy (2010) para. 35; Scottish
Government, Scottish Planning Policy (2014) para. 25.
39 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), The Future We Want, UN
Doc. A/66/L.56 (24 July 2012) para. 19.
40 UNCSD, Rio+20 Voluntary Commitments (2012), at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/
voluntarycommitments.html>.
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Unlike in post-colonial and post-socialist countries,41 very little academic
work examines specifically the potential connection between discourses of
sustainable development and discourses of nationalism in Western countries.
This failure may be due to an impression that the kinds of sustainable
development that are developed and implemented in the West are
unproblematic since they adhere to accepted Western and scientific norms
surrounding the meaning of sustainable development. Previous research that
has considered the role of nation-states in shaping sustainable development
policies and strategies tends to focus on the organizations and practices of
the state, and there is little explicit treatment of the connections between
sustainable development and the discourses of nationalism.42 Other work has
examined the forms of environmental politics that characterize some
Western states, for example, exploring the relationship between Plaid
Cymru, the national Party of Wales, and the Green Party,43 and the link
between territorial identity and Scotland's ambitious climate change and
renewable energy programmes.44 However, this work deals largely with the
links between nationalism and environmental or climate discourses, and not
the broader sustainable development agenda. It also tends to think of
nationalist discourses in terms that are too exclusive in nature. Nationalist
discourses include but extend well beyond the policies and practices of
nationalist parties or how governments use territorial distinctiveness to
maximize their region's autonomy and its status within the larger state and
beyond.45
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41 J.D Oldfield, `Russia, systemic transformation and the concept of sustainable
development' (2001) 10(3) Environmental Politics 94; J.D Oldfield and D.J.B Shaw,
`V.I. Vernadsky and the noosphere concept: Russian understandings of society-
nature interaction' (2006) 37 Geoforum 145; R. Black and E. Watson, `Local
Community, Legitimacy, and Cultural Authenticity in Postconflict Natural Resource
Management: Ethiopia and Mozambique' (2006) 24 Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space 263; X.A. de Sartre and R. Taravella, `National sovereignty vs.
sustainable development: lessons from the narrative on the internationalization of
the Brazilian Amazon' (2009) 28 Political Geography 406; K.Z.S. Schwartz, `Wild
horses in a European wilderness: imagining sustainable development in the post
communist countryside' (2005) 12 Cultural Geographies 292.
42 H. Bruyninckx, S. Happaerts, and K. van den Brande (eds.), Sustainable
Development and Subnational Governments: Policy-Making and Multi-Level
Interactions (2012); E. Royles and N. McEwen, `Climate change policy, multi-
level governance and inter-governmental relations in a devolved UK' (2014); Ross,
op. cit., n. 30.
43 R. Jones and C. Fowler, Placing the Nation: Aberystwyth and the Reproduction of
Welsh Nationalism (2008).
44 McEwen and Bomberg, op. cit., n. 12.
45 id., p. 69; Calhoun, op. cit., n. 9.
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POTENTIAL CONNECTIONS AND TENSIONS BETWEEN
NATIONALIST AND SUSTAINABILITY DISCOURSES
Effective sustainability discourses will reflect key features of good sustain-
able governance including but not limited to: taking the long-term view;
integrating environmental concerns into decision making; relying on sound
science; promoting wide participation and accountability. We see both
connections and tensions between these features and those prominent in
nationalist discourses. We have identified five features of nationalist dis-
courses that tend to complement or connect with sustainability discourses.
These mainly flow from a mutual aim to improve wellbeing, progress, and
develop. Conversely, we have identified three potential tensions between the
two discourses that are worthy of further examination. As will be discussed
in detail below, these tensions relate to the fact that the two discourses often
operate at different spatial and temporal levels. Each feature is discussed
generally then used to justify our choice of study area ± Scotland. These
eight features provide the framework for analysing the two case studies.
1. Capacity to make transformative change
As discussed above, effective sustainability discourses require some legal,
financial, moral, and/or administrative capacity to integrate environmental
concerns into key decision-making processes.46 Capacity varies between
nations and even sovereign states. It is influenced by constitutional and
legislative power, economic and natural resources, civil society networks, and
political factors, such as leadership and political will.47 It is also limited by the
constraints imposed by multi-level governance.48 For example, China has
significantly more capacity on the world stage than Malta as a small state
subject to the constraints of the European Union. Prior to devolution, Scotland
was a `nation' with a strong identity and significant resources but only limited
capacity to deal with its own affairs. Under the Scotland Act 1998, full
legislative and ministerial49 powers were transferred from the United Kingdom
parliament to the newly created Scottish parliament and Scottish government,50
237
46 Bruyninckx et al., op. cit., n. 42; J. Porritt, The standing of sustainable development
in government (2009); McEwen and Bomberg, op. cit., n. 12.
47 Royles and McEwen, op. cit., n. 42.
48 McEwen and Bomberg, op. cit., n. 12.
49 Where previously power lay with the Secretary of State, it now lies with `the
Scottish Ministers'.
50 The statutory term in the Scotland Act 1998 is `Scottish Executive', but since 2007
(when a minority Scottish National Party government was formed) the term
`Scottish Government' has been widely adopted and is given statutory acceptance in
the current Scotland Bill.
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except for certain reserved matters.51 Responsibility for the environment,
agriculture, forestry, fishing, town and country planning, education, and health,
among other things and subject to the rather stringent constraints of EU law,
now lie with the Scottish authorities.52 Many of these powers are integral to
accelerating progress towards sustainability. Many other powers have been
delegated to the Scottish ministers through executive devolution.53 Further
powers were devolved in 2012 including a new Scottish rate of income tax (up
to 10p) and borrowing powers worth £5bn. Following the No vote for
independence in September 2014, there is cross-party agreement to further
increase Scotland's powers.54 The Scotland Bill introduced in the United
Kingdom parliament in May 2015, gives Holyrood control over income tax
rates and bands, a half share in VAT revenues, and a greater say over welfare
powers in Scotland.55 However, the SNP, buoyed by its success in the British
general election in 2015, (56 of Scotland's 59 MPs are SNP), is pressing for full
fiscal autonomy in Scotland, calling for further powers over employment laws,
the minimum wage, and business taxes also to be devolved.56 Where these
powers ought to lie is beyond the scope of this article, and while issues of
autonomy, coordination, and economies of scale are relevant to sustainability,
as noted above, increased legislative and executive capacity on its own is
insufficient to deliver change. Real transformation depends on the political will
to make the tough decisions needed to accelerate progress towards sustainable
development, and this often depends on cultural acceptance and understanding.
2. The space, time, and processes to promote more representative decision
making
Effective stakeholder involvement and efficient knowledge management are
considered essential to transformative sustainable development.57 Principle
10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides that
`environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned
citizens at the relevant level.'58 Meaningful public engagement in the
238
51 The reserved matters are set out in Schedule 5 to the 1998 Act, with further
restrictions stated in Schedule 4. The United Kingdom Parliament retains the power
to legislate on any subject but subject to the convention this is only with the consent
of the Scottish Parliament: Scotland Act 1998, s. 28(7).
52 G. Little, `Scottish Devolution and Environmental Law' (2000) 12 J. of Environ-
mental Law 155; C.T. Reid, `Devolution and the Environment' (2000) 8(2) Hume
Papers on Public Policy ± Environment and Regulation 101.
53 Scotland Act 1998, s. 63.
54 Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of
powers to the Scottish Parliament (2014).
55 Scotland Bill (Bill 3 HC) 2015±16.
56 Labour and SNP table amendments to Scotland Bill, at <https://www.holyrood.com/
articles/news/labour-and-snp-table-amendments-scotland-bill>.
57 OECD, op. cit., n. 16, p. 6; UNDESA, op. cit., n. 31.
58 UN General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874.
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decision-making processes of international institutions and large states can
be difficult.59 One of the benefits of carving up state power is to provide
space for more discussion, debate, and civic and public engagement. Indeed,
at the outset of devolution, the United Kingdom government asserted `that
bringing government closer to the people through devolution is itself a policy
for sustainable development.'60 The Scottish Parliament provides a
dedicated forum to discuss, debate, and decide Scottish matters. Moreover,
those campaigning for devolution sought fundamental improvements in the
informal rules and processes that influence the way Scotland is governed.
Four guiding principles were developed by the Consultative Steering Group
on the Scottish Parliament to inform their work on devolution, namely,
sharing power; accountability; openness, accessibility, and involvement; and
equal opportunities. The principles were perceived as not only essential for
good governance but also reflective of Scottish national values. With cross-
party support, both the Scottish Parliament and Scottish government sub-
sequently endorsed and continue to work towards the principles.61 In line
with these values, Scotland legislated beyond the scope of the Strategic
Environmental Assessment Directive to include strategies as well as certain
plans and programmes.62
3. Desire to improve the wellbeing of the nation and its people
Human wellbeing now and in the future is at the core of sustainable
development as defined in the Brundtland Report.63 In the main, nationalist
discourses are predicated on the need to protect and enhance the wellbeing of
national territories or homelands and some have argued that therein lies a large
part of their discursive power.64 The overall purpose of the current Scottish
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59 L.A. Duvic-Paoli, `The Status of the Right to Public Participation in International
Environmental Law: An Analysis of the Jurisprudence' (2012) 23 Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 80.
60 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), A better quality of
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S1M-39 passed unanimously: see Scottish Parliament Official Report (SPOR) 1(8),
9 June 1999, cols. 367ff; Scottish Ministerial Code, para. 3.1.
62 Environmental Assessment (Scotland) 2005, s. 4(4).
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government reflects this strong desire: `To focus government and public
services on creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all of
Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic growth.'65
4. Understanding of values and views of the nation
As discussed above in the context of sustainability discourses, real change
requires a cultural acceptance that prioritizes operating within the Earth's
limits. While many individuals and collectives accept the rhetoric of limits,
in terms of their actions, the future of the planet is still taken for granted.66
As such, any attempts at reform needs to `reflect', `belong to', and `fit' the
population it hopes to influence. As a nation, Scots have certain traditions,
icons, and perceived shared values that could be used to support sustainable
living and challenge unsustainable behaviours. Scots perceive themselves as
strongly committed to social justice; however, most research into public
attitudes on social and economic policy matters shows Scots are actually
close to the `mean' or average view in the wider context of the United
Kingdom.67 Even on high-profile matters such as nuclear weapons and
tuition fees, studies show views in Scotland to be not very different from
those in England and Wales.68 Comparison with another nation is a powerful
tool of nationalism.69 As Henderson and McEwen explain, whether values
are actually distinct and divergent may be less crucial than the perception
that this is the case.70 As revealed in the case studies below, it is how these
values are balanced and prioritized in practice and in different contexts that
can lead to very different approaches to sustainability. Some will be more
transformative than others.
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73, at 80; Henderson and McEwen, op. cit., n. 5, p. 180.
70 Henderson and McEwen, id.
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5. Ambition to be admired and well respected on a world stage
Being a nation as opposed to simply a sub-state can make a difference. In his
study of sustainable development policy in sub-state governments, Happaerts
found that international legitimacy pressures have a decisive effect on those
sub-state governments that are eager to apply identity politics, in the sense
that they incite them to act in order to conform to international requirements
whereas other sub-state governments might be hesitant to conduct sustain-
able development policies all together.71 Likewise McEwen and Bomberg
observe that:
Governments engaging in policy making within strong identity nations and
regions often frame their goals and demands as an opportunity to maximize the
region's autonomy and its voice and status within the larger state and
beyond.72
Successive Scottish governments have sought to increase Scotland's
international standing through its role in the EU, exports, tourism, and so
on. The 2015 government strategy explicitly sets out `promoting Scotland on
the international stage to boost our trade and investment, influence and
networks' as one of the government's priorities.73
6. Potential to be inward looking (first tension)
Sustainability discourses make much of the need to connect ± the global and
the local ± witnessed most clearly in the sustainability exhortation to `think
globally and act locally'. In contrast, a key aspect of any nation is its strong
association with a particular tract of land or territory thus reinforcing the
notion that discourses of nationalism are ultimately centred on the national
territory and the national scale.74 `Nations' bring together a significant
number of very different individuals and groups due simply to their physical
proximity or attachment to a `place'. The affiliation with a particular place
can make nationalist discourses focused on the needs and interests of the
nation and not beyond. Activities within a nation including its finances,
demand for imports, exports, pollution emissions, contributions of develop-
ment aid, and tourism can have significant impacts elsewhere in the world.
What is good for Scotland may seriously harm another part of the world.
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72 McEwen and Bomberg, op. cit., n. 12.
73 Scottish Government, op. cit. (2015), n. 65.
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7. Potential to focus on the short term and immediate pressures
The Brundtland definition, by explicitly linking the needs of the present with
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, illustrates how
sustainable development is used to connect present and future generations. In
contrast, much of the explicit focus in the academic literature on nationalist
discourses is on examining national pasts as well as the way in which these
can inform national presents (very rarely their futures).75 Moreover, and
particularly when sub-state nations are hoping to retain power or seek more
autonomy, they will want to deliver benefits to the current electorate as soon
as possible. Thus, often (but not always), nationalist discourses will give
more weight to resolving short-term pressures over long-term issues.
8. Potential for the dominant view to prevail
Wide public engagement and legitimacy are key features of sustainability
discourses. One of the aims of introducing proportional representation into
the Scottish Parliament was to get more accurate representation of the
nation's views in its parliament and minority and coalition government with
the resulting debates and compromises more likely.76 The constitutional
principles set out earlier also seek to widen participation. However, as in any
organization, the dominant view is that of the people in charge. If, as has
been the case in Scotland from 2011 to the present, the government party has
an overall majority despite electoral structures designed to avoid such
dominance, it can feel `more representative' than it may actually be, its
opposition is weakened, and other mechanisms designed to promote wider
involvement considered unnecessary.
CASE STUDIES
1. Justification for the chosen case studies
These connections and tensions are examined in more detail using two case
studies. The broad interpretation of nationalist discourses used here means
they occur in all aspects of everyday life ± on television, in pubs and
hairdressers, online, in court, and over the fence between neighbours. This
makes systematic analysis very difficult. As such, we have used the
legislative process for Acts of the Scottish Parliament to structure and
confine the discourses explored in our study. Almost by definition, the
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76 Scottish Parliament electoral system, at <http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
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ß 2016 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society ß 2016 Cardiff University Law School
legislative process and the reporting thereof provide opportunities for
nationalist discourses on a readily identifiable subject by numerous actors
including stakeholders and the public. This restriction also ensures Scotland,
as a nation, has the capacity to address that subject. Policies and ideas are
tested, differing views are sought, debated, recorded, and capable of analysis.
This approach also has the benefit of imposing a natural end to the study, that
being the passage of the Act. As the aim here is to explore the interaction of
nationalist and sustainability discourses, both of the Acts chosen have a
strong environmental content and by design, the events surrounding their
passage strongly illustrate sustainability discourses in Scotland.
The limits to this approach also must be acknowledged. In the main,
those involved are a self-selecting group of interested participants many of
whom understand how to engage with what is a rather formal process. As
such, the discourses studied while representative of a wide range of sectors
within Scotland may not be necessarily be representative of the whole of the
nation.
2. Case study 1 ± the run-up to the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009
(CCSA)
This first case study illustrates how, on occasion, the connections and
tensions described above can line up to point in the same direction and lead
to ambitious change. In 1998, the Scottish Executive (now known as the
`Scottish Government') commissioned an independent expert study to
improve the understanding of the implications of climate change in Scotland,
to inform policy responses and to help identify measures to reduce green-
house gas emissions. Experts were consulted representing six key sectors
affected by climate change: energy; transport; domestic; public services;
business; and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Among other things, the
findings showed that it was likely that in future Scotland will be warmer,
with rising sea levels, more severe weather, rainfall, and flooding. This was
likely to adversely affect some bird species, marine and freshwater fisheries,
and transport, as well as create new health issues in Scotland. Renewable
energy sources would become increasingly important.77
The findings were used then to inform the draft Scottish Climate Change
Programme. In 2000, Sarah Boyack, then Minister for Transport and the
Environment in Scotland, outlined the draft programme and urged industry,
environmental interest groups, local authorities, universities, and other
private and public organizations not only to take part in the consultation but
to work together and help reach a consensus view on the most cost-effective
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and practical ways of combating climate change.78 Building on this, Scottish
civic society has been active in climate change issues since the beginning,
encouraged by successive Scottish governments.79
In the early 2000s, both the United Kingdom and Scotland moved forward
with ambitious initiatives and together advocated stringent emissions
reduction policies within the EU and internationally. Additional research
continued to increase knowledge on climate change, most notably the Stern
Review, The Economics of Climate Change, published in 2006 which con-
cluded that climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure
ever seen and that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change far
outweigh the costs of not acting.80 When the United Kingdom passed the
Climate Change Act 2008 that set a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by 34 per cent of 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2020, Scotland, along
with the other devolved administrations, signed agreements in support.81
As noted by Royles and McEwen, successive Scottish administrations
have carved out distinctive and increasingly ambitious platforms of their
own while still operating within the confines of the United Kingdom pro-
grammes.82 For example, in 2006, the Scottish programme identified both an
equitable contribution to United Kingdom emissions reduction targets (`the
Scottish share') and a `Scottish target' that would exceed the Scottish share
by a million tonnes of carbon.83 Following the election of the Scottish
National Party (SNP) government in 2007 there was an obvious desire to
exceed those targets and on 29 January 2008, the government published a
consultation that set out proposals for a Scottish Climate Change Bill.
The government received a total of 21,046 responses to the consultation
including 20,728 responses generated by the eight campaigns run by five
non-governmental organizations ± Friends of the Earth, RSPB Scotland,
UNISON, the World Development Movement, and WWF. Indeed, a wide
range of NGOs joined forces with church and labour organizations to form a
cohesive and effective coalition under the banner, Stop Climate Chaos
Scotland. Many of these groups focused on the injustices caused by climate
change and its impact on vulnerable communities.84 Through intense
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79 Stop Climate Chaos Scotland (SCCS), at <http://www.stopclimatechaos.org/stop-
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80 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (2007).
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strations on the Implementation of the Climate Change Act 2008.
82 Royles and McEwen, op. cit., n. 42.
83 Scottish Executive, Changing our Ways; Scotland's Climate Change Programme
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lobbying it put pressure on the political parties to raise their ambitions during
the passage of the Climate Change (Scotland) Bill.85 Key business players,
such as the Scottish Climate Change Business Delivery Group identified
opportunities for business innovation and investment and pressed for the
higher 42 per cent 2020 target in the final stages of the legislative process.86
The CCSA, as passed unanimously by the Scottish Parliament, imposes a
statutory obligation to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions by 42 per cent by
2020 and 80 per cent by 2050. The Scottish Act is broader in scope and
ambition than either the preceding Scottish Executive Climate Change
programmes or the United Kingdom Act and, unlike the latter, includes a
higher interim target and obliges the government to set annual targets subject
to parliamentary approval. It regulates the activities of government, the
private sector, and individuals and covers numerous sectors, including
forestry, land use, the promotion of energy efficiency, waste reduction and
recycling, as well as provisions for adapting to climate change.87
The passage of the CCSA reveals some interesting features about the
relationship between sustainability and nationalist discourses and how the
connections and tensions between the two can operate in practice to promote
transformational change.
First, the connecting features of capacity and international ambition are
evident in this case study. Climate change was not explicitly reserved under
the Scotland Act 1998 and thus, by default, was within the powers of the
Scottish institutions as a devolved matter. The SNP government was quick to
act on what it saw as a significant international issue on the basis that a firm
commitment to tackling climate change would raise Scotland's profile on an
international stage. McEwan and Bomberg suggest that:
for parties seeking greater political autonomy or independent statehood, like
the SNP in Scotland, climate ambition provides an opportunity to nurture
perceptions of national prosperity and self-sufficiency, and to engage in
`paradiplomacy' to assert national autonomy and nurture their perception
internationally as `nation-states in waiting'.88
It worked. The press were quick to observe that the day before the Scottish
Parliament unanimously passed the 42 per cent target, the United States had
stated that a 40 per cent cut by 2020 was `not on the cards'.89 Indeed, the
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head of WWF International's global climate initiative, said:
At least one nation is prepared to aim for climate legislation that follows the
science. Scotland made the first step to show others that it can be done. We
now need others to follow.90
Next, the facts surrounding the passage of the CCSA show how more
representative processes can operate in practice and highlight the strength of
civic society and Scotland's policy network. Both the structure of the Bill
and the ambitions included within the carbon reduction targets were subject
to a broad range of influences including a significant input from the public.91
Myles summarizes the history of the Bill well:
Pressure for climate legislation was applied by environmental NGOs across
the UK and duly appeared in several party manifestos, resulting in Bills at both
Westminster and Holyrood. Scotland was already experiencing a growing
culture of the politics of negotiation within its policy community, caused
partly by the system of proportional representation used for elections, and by
the ethos of participation and accessibility established by the cross-party/no
party Consultative Steering Group as the basis for the operation of the new
institutions. At the same time the policy capacity and expertise of the political
parties was diminishing, and greater reliance was being placed on the ideas
and expertise of an increasingly confident and knowledgeable civic sector.92
The processes above also reveal the prominence of certain common
values and views in Scots discourses, as well as the extent of the public
interest in the law-making process. The findings of the Scottish-based
scoping strategy sounded a chord with Scots and their representatives both
inside and outside Parliament. The study was commissioned in Scotland, led
by Scottish experts, and included specific facts about the impacts in
Scotland. Together, with the findings of the Stern Review, Scots had the
information and evidence required to form an opinion ± something that
chimed well with Scottish sensibilities. To quote Scots philosopher, his-
torian, economist, and writer David Hume: `A wise man, therefore, propor-
tions his belief to the evidence.'93 As Andy Myles, Parliamentary Officer for
Scottish Environment Link explains:
Scotland does not make policy by pulling on emotional heartstrings or relying
on rhetoric. Scots are argumentative ± in a good way ± want to talk it out, want
scientific evidence, want productive debate and the political system provides
that broader policy base to provide the `space' for discussion. It is hard to find
a `non-believer' in climate change in Scotland.94
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The story also demonstrates a strong inward focus based on the perceived
benefits to Scotland. The Scottish Finance Secretary noted in introducing the
Bill to Parliament that: `This Bill could provide huge opportunities for our
economy by providing business with the certainty that it needs to make
investment decisions.'95
Finally, what is not evident in this story is an opportunity for the dominant
view to prevail. Indeed, the existence of a minority government created
opportunities for innovation. The Bill required opposition support to pass.
This provided the broad alliance of climate campaigners (with trade unions,
faith groups, and many others working with the environmentalists) with the
opportunity to play a significant role. Initially, the SNP had proposed a 34
per cent target and it was Scottish Labour who was advancing a 40 per cent
reduction. The final 42 per cent target is largely due to political parties
successively trying to outdo one another.96 Thus, this obvious political
struggle resulted in a target with the potential to accelerate transformative
change. Also, as Boyack recalls:
The thing that was significant about that bill was that it was at a point where
there was no significant majority and we all had to work together and I think
that the environmental campaigners saw that opportunity and made the most of
it, which I think, was a good thing.97
The passage of the CCSA reveals how connections and tensions between
nationalist and sustainability discourses fortuitously aligned to push forward
a more transformative sustainability agenda. Indeed, the long-term, short-
term, national, and global benefits all operated to support and enhance
sustainability discourses. The postscript to this story is not quite so rosy. The
2015 annual progress report shows that while Scotland has done well in
implementing emission reduction measures in a number of areas such as
renewable electricity generation, it missed its legislated target for the fourth
consecutive year, and there has been limited progress to reduce emissions
from transport and agriculture, with `carbon sinks' (such as forests) also
falling short of government targets.98 This more mixed picture illustrates the
balancing and evolutionary nature of sustainability discourses and the extent
progress depends on the political climate and context of the discourses.
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3. Case study 2 ± the duties to achieve sustainable economic growth in the
Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (RRSA)
The next case study analyses the discourses leading up to the passage of the
RRSA and, more specifically, the crystallization of the government's overall
purpose of increasing sustainable economic growth into law. In contrast to
the previous case study, it describes a complex and muddled journey with an
indecisive outcome. The direction was set by the dominant territorial politics
of a majority government and then supported and challenged by differing
views within broader nationalist discourses. The story depicts the reality of
most sustainability discourses within nations. While it shows the tensions
between the two discourses pulling in opposite directions, on a more positive
note it also shows how the connections between the discourses can provide
opportunities to encourage more transformative actions that are broadly
acceptable to the nation.
The story begins in 2007 when, following its election to government, the
victorious SNP was quick to replace the previous government's sustainable
development strategy with its own Economic Strategy (the `Strategy').99 In
it, Scottish government adopted a single purpose: `To focus government and
public services on creating a more successful country, with opportunities for
all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic growth.'
The Strategy in its entirety sets out a systematic approach to governance that
is clear, focused, and SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant,
and time-bound).100
The government's intention is to mainstream sustainable development
across government through its commitment to `sustainable economic
growth'. Its approach to sustainability, at least on its face, is not aligned
with the United Kingdom Framework as it appears to favour economic
growth over social and environmental factors. Policy is not binding and the
new purpose attracted only a limited amount of grumbling. As the Sustain-
able Development Commission in Scotland (SDCS) concluded in 2009:
`taken as a whole, the Purpose, with its emphasis on `` opportunities for all of
Scotland to flourish'' requires Government to address wider sustainable
development issues.'101 The strategy did raise some procedural concerns as
it was not subject to a Strategic Environmental Assessment or any other form
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of public consultation.102 From 2007 to 2015 the strategy, its overall
purpose, and approach remained largely unchanged103 and been incorporated
into key strategic documents, including those relating to land and marine
planning, the NHS, and historic buildings.104
In August 2012, the government published a consultation paper on
proposals for a better regulation Bill that, among other things, sought views
on a duty to promote economic and business growth in regulatory activity.105
This reflected concerns raised by the business community in Scotland. A
study by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) in 2012 reported that:
around 30 per cent of FSB members in Scotland have cited regulation as the
biggest barrier to growth. In addition, 62 per cent of our members report that
the costs of complying with regulation have increased over the past four
years.106
An independent analysis of the 80 responses found opinion divided about
imposing a new economic duty on regulators: 41 per cent of respondents,
mainly local authorities, the third sector, and individuals saw it as a diversion
from the main purpose of regulation and were against its introduction.
Another 29 per cent, mostly from businesses and trade associations, were in
favour of the duty and a further 31 per cent of respondents had mixed
views.107
There was also a view that the time had come for the Scottish Environ-
ment Protection Agency (SEPA) to have a statutory purpose and update its
funding arrangements, enforcement powers, and offences.108 The govern-
ment chose to consult on changes relating to SEPA jointly with SEPA, in
two stages.109 The second consultation proposed a new purpose for SEPA
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that included a reference to contribute to `the achievement of sustainable
economic growth'.110 While most respondents (62 per cent) agreed SEPA
should have a statutory purpose,111 once again, the respondents were divided
about proposals to replace its existing sustainable development provisions
with a reference to sustainable economic growth.112 Moreover, the process
itself was arguably flawed ± the new purpose is not in the title of the
consultation, it was not published on the government website immediately,
and the individual responses were not published online.113
Despite the concerns raised in the consultation period, the Regulatory
Reform (Scotland) Bill introduced by the government in the Scottish
Parliament requires certain public bodies, in exercising their regulatory
functions,114 to contribute to achieving sustainable economic growth, except
to the extent that it would be inconsistent with the exercise of those functions
to do so. Subsequent provisions set out powers for the Scottish Ministers to
give guidance to regulators and issue a code of practice.115 The above does
not apply where a regulator is, by or under an enactment, already subject to a
duty to the same effect as that mentioned in that subsection.116
The Bill also introduced a new general purpose for SEPA to carry out its
functions `for the purpose of protecting and improving the environment
(including managing natural resources in a sustainable way).' In carrying out
its functions for that purpose SEPA must, except to the extent that it would
be inconsistent with [the above] to do so, contribute to:
(a) improving the health and wellbeing of people in Scotland, and
(b) achieving sustainable economic growth.117
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The Bill was examined by three parliamentary committees: the Delegated
Powers and Law Reform Committee (DPLRC), the Economy, Energy and
Tourism Committee (EETC), and the Rural Affairs, Climate Change and
Environment Committee (RACCEC). Many individuals and groups in
Scotland from a wide range of backgrounds and sectors took the opportunity
provided by the legislative process to provide evidence to parliamentary
committees on the Bill, including the merit of the two duties to contribute to
achieving sustainable economic growth.118 Opinion on the two duties was
split between groups of witnesses. Those in favour of the duty, mainly
business representatives and the government itself, focused their evidence on
the Bill's better regulation objective and sought predictable, efficient regula-
tion.119 The FSB Scotland stated that `A duty to contribute to sustainable
economic growth could provide stronger focus on improving how regulators
interact with businesses, with the aim of facilitating compliant growth.'120
Other respondents including Green Party MSPs, the Convention of
Scottish Local Authorities, the Law Society of Scotland, the Royal Society
for the Protection of Birds, Scottish Trades Union Congress, and UNISON
raised concerns over the potential of the duties to prioritize economic growth
over other environmental and social objectives.121 Representatives from
several sectors, including business, raised concerns about the ambiguity
caused by the wording of the duties and their relationship with existing
obligations on public bodies including those relating to sustainable
development and best value.122
All three committee reports raised concerns. The DPLRC warned of the
limited scrutiny offered for the proposed guidance and the code of prac-
tice.123 The RACCEC report expressed unease about the meaning of
sustainable economic growth and how the duty and the code of practice
would impact on the day-to-day activities of regulators. It also questioned
why the term sustainable economic growth was used instead of sustainable
development since, while neither has a statutory definition, sustainable
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development has international recognition, is understood legally across a
number of regimes and jurisdictions, and has been used in previous Scottish
legislation.124 The lead EETC report noted that Parliament and the Scottish
government have a duty to minimize the risk of future conflicts by ensuring
that the Scottish government's definition of sustainable economic growth is
explicitly stated and explained in subsequent guidance.125
Given the government majority in Parliament, it is unsurprising that the
RRSA 2014 was passed on 16 January 2014 broadly unchanged.
The events surrounding the passage of the RRSA show the tensions
between nationalist and sustainability discourses and how some issues can
cause views to converge while others divide opinion. It also reveals how the
balancing inherent in sustainability discourses occurs in practice and how
difficult it is in practice to move beyond business-as-usual decision making.
There was never any doubt that the Scottish government had the capacity
to legislate in this case. Instead, it is the use of that capacity, the effect of a
majority government, and the impact of this on the processes of Scottish
nationalist discourses that is of interest here. The case study reveals how
nationalist ambitions and a desire to show strong leadership with measurable
results can run counter to transformative sustainability discourses. One
reason behind the SNP government focusing on sustainable economic
growth was that it wanted to establish itself as more than a single-issue party
and be accepted as a party of governance, capable of running a separate,
independent Scotland. By prioritizing the economy and presenting its
approach in a clear and logical economic strategy, it did send that message.
However, in doing so, the Scottish government twice chose to ignore
accepted processes and values of nationalist discourses in Scotland that are
also important to effective sustainability discourses. The government failed
to complete a strategic environmental assessment for the economic strategy
that first introduced `sustainable economic growth' or consult properly on it.
It also failed to consult properly on the purpose and functions of SEPA,
instead largely leaving it to the Agency, and then failed to fully publish both
the consultation and its responses. It is disheartening to see these processes
set aside as they embody and promote shared responsibility and governance
and are essential to the wider acceptance of any approach to sustainable
development. It is also an example of the dominant view prevailing and how
the perceived legitimacy of a majority government can be used to justify the
circumvention of accepted processes designed to promote wider nationalist
discourse. However, on a more positive note, even faced with a majority
government, civic society in Scotland had the space to influence decision
making, and the postscript to this story illustrates the resilience of these
wider processes. Subsequent to the passage of the Act, the government has
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actively responded to the concerns surrounding the term `sustainable
economic growth' and discussion continues, especially in relation to the
emphasis on growth and its relationship with sustainable development.
Serious efforts have been made through codes of practice and guidelines to
try to suitably define sustainable economic growth and meaningfully relate it
to sustainable development. Since the passage of the RRSA, the government
has presented no fewer than four different interpretations for sustainable
economic growth thus fine-tuning government policy to make it more widely
accepted by stakeholders and the public.126 Some of these subsequent
interpretations, are more ecologically focused than others.127
The events surrounding the passage of the RRSA illustrate the plurality of
values in both nationalist and sustainability discourses and how civic society
and wider policy networks challenged the perceived prioritization of the
economy to include justice and environmental factors. Sustainability is
rarely about win-win-win and is more often about trade-offs and making
hard choices. The events leading up to and following the passage of the
RRSA reveal the importance of the economy to both nationalist and
sustainability discourses in Scotland. It also, however, reveals the extent to
which views about its role in sustainable development are polarized. A
reason behind the government's attachment to the phrase `sustainable
economic growth' is that it considers the economy to be a key focus for
Scots. However, while many Scots appreciated economic arguments behind
the SNP government's attempt to `do things differently' from Westminster
by sidestepping the concept of sustainable development and introducing their
own term, `sustainable economic growth', concerns were raised in many
sectors that `growth' does not take into account wider social justice aspects
encompassed in the wider term `development'.128 These observations are
consistent with studies that show that there is a small but consistent tendency
for those identifying as Scottish to hold strong social democratic values and a
distinct conception of the welfare state that is favourable to universalism.129
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Hearn describes this, using the concept of moral economy to capture a
diffuse sense of what is fair which acts to moderate the application of purely
market criteria in public affairs.130 One positive observation from this case
study is that the processes allowed these divergent views to be revealed and
debated, and that the attempts at consensus continue to evolve.
The case study also reveals a plurality of views about the future within
both nationalist and sustainability discourses. The consultations and
legislative passage of the RRSA took place between 2012 and 2014 at the
same time as the campaigns on the referendum for Scottish independence.
The key advocates for the new duty for sustainable economic growth were
the SNP government who were clearly also in favour of independence; their
key political opponents on the duty were the Green Party who were also pro-
independence. Thus, the alternative views on sustainability were not aligned
to particular views about whether Scotland was better in or out of the United
Kingdom. To quote Patrick Harvie MSP and Leader of the Scottish Green
Party:
On many issues, Greens part company with others in the pro-independence
movement . . . we could be pioneering new approaches to economics, replacing
the outdated and misleading GDP statistics with indicators showing the health
and wellbeing of our population, the strength of our communities, the sharing
of our wealth and the ecological limits we live within.131
Indeed, by showcasing the two parties in favour of Yes ± the SNP and the
Scottish Green Party ± offering very different visions of an independent
Scotland, the debates also revealed how different visions of Scotland's future
would play out in practice.
CONCLUSIONS
Talking about sustainable development is relatively easy; however,
delivering the transformative action necessary to actually make it happen
has proven much more difficult. Having a Parliament dedicated to Scottish
issues has given Scotland increased capacity to make transformative change
and a forum for debating key issues for sustainability. However, real change
also requires a cultural acceptance that prioritizes operating within the
Earth's limits and thinking about the long-term effects of policies and
decisions. This article has examined the potential of nationalist discourses as
a vehicle for promoting this cultural change. More specifically, it has
identified certain tensions and connections between sustainability and
nationalist discourses.
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Occasionally, the connections between nationalist and sustainability
discourses can point to the same transformative action; views align. The
connections between the two discourses then reinforce the action and change
is easy. At other times, long-term, global interests may be contrary to short-
term, nationalist ones. The tensions are real, and difficult choices need to be
made. Often the compromises made do not lead away from business-as-usual
policy making. However, the case studies above suggest that it may be
worthwhile in these circumstances to recall and maximize the connections
between sustainability and nationalist discourses by, for example, promoting
more representative decision making, focusing on improving wellbeing,
understanding the values and views of the nation, and improving its standing
outside its borders.
This approach is supported by the views of those involved in sustain-
ability advocacy and policy development in Scotland. For example, framing
sustainability arguments in economic and welfare terms resonates well with
Scots. As a former Cabinet Minister, Sarah Boyack notes that:
The argument I always make is that if something is good for the environment,
good for people's quality of life then it is invariably good for the economy and
one of Scotland's big challenges is to create jobs that pay people decent
amounts and that are good for the long term.132
In Scotland, therefore, environmental limits could be added to policy making
by putting it in the context of wellbeing, distributional justice, and fair-
ness.133 The Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition government
explored this link in their focus on environmental justice.134 The current
government under Nicola Sturgeon's explicit focus on tackling inequality
could also potentially include inter-generational equity.135 Likewise, Scots
are more likely to engage in policy making if presented with the right
evidence. As Myles explains: `If we want to advocate sustainability, we need
to be authoritative, we need to get the facts right and they need to be
scientifically based.'136
Arguably, these connections and tensions are present in all decision-
making processes within nations. However, as noted above, how they
interact with each other, the weight attached to each, the balancing and
compromises that follow will vary and this makes each situation, even within
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the same nation, specific to its context. Within Scotland, besides the two case
studies, the relationship between sustainability and nationalist discourses is
well illustrated in the discussions about the new rules on land reform, marine
spatial planning, and genetically modified crops. More widely, the varying
opinions over the need for austerity and particular austerity measures
demonstrate the relationship between sustainability and nationalist
discourses in different nations.
There is no guarantee that nationalist discourses will promote trans-
formative visions of sustainability. However, engagement at the level of
`nation' may lead to sustainability discourses that are more attuned to the
priorities of particular groups of people and improve public understanding
and acceptance of the need for transformative change by tailoring the sub-
stance of sustainability discourses to nationalist values, as well as providing
additional opportunities for debate, public participation, and education.
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